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Abstract 
 
While pay mix is one of the most frequently used variables in recent compensation 
research, its theoretical relevance and measurement remains underdeveloped. There is little 
agreement among studies on the definitions of the various forms of pay that go into pay mix. 
Even studies that examine the same theories tend to overlook the implications of differences in 
the measures and meanings of pay mix used in other studies. Our study explores the meaning 
of pay mix using several theories commonly used in recent compensation research (agency, 
efficiency wage, expectancy, equity, and person-organization fit). Recent studies generally use 
a single measure of mix (e.g., bonus/base, or stock options/total, or benefits/base). We argue 
that to fully understand the effects of employee compensation, the multiple forms of 
compensation must be taken into account. Therefore, we derived pay mix measures from the 
theories commonly used in compensation research. We classified the pay mix policies of 478 
firms using cluster-analytic techniques. We found that the classification of organizations based 
on their pay mix depends on the measures used. We suggest that as more realistic measures of 
pay mix leads to reinterpretation of compensation research and offers directions for theory 
development.  
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Organizational Pay Mix: 
The Implications of Various Theoretical Perspectives for the 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Individual Pay Components 
 
 A growing body of research recognizes the importance of compensation in influencing 
employee attitudes and organization performance (Heneman & Judge, 2000; Gerhart, 2000). 
Traditionally, studies have focused on how different dimensions of compensation management 
(e.g., pay level, pay structures) relate to employee attitudes and organizational performance 
(Bloom, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Heneman & Judge, 2000). The literature has also 
long recognized compensation comes in many forms; i.e., base pay, bonus, stock options, 
benefits (Dreher, Ash, & Bretz, 1988; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Although its potential 
importance is well-acknowledged (Martocchio, 2001), research is only beginning to delve into 
how organizations mix different forms of compensation and their consequences.  
 This is not to say that research has ignored pay mix. Indeed, many studies included pay 
mix variables in their analyses. A common method of examining pay mix is to measure the ratio 
of bonus to base pay (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Werner & Tosi, 1995). Others use the 
ratio of bonus to total pay (e.g., Anderson, Banker, & Ravindran, 2000; Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & 
Hinkin, 1987) or the ratio of long-term incentives to total pay (e.g., Westphal, 1999; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995). While quite a few studies have been conducted, and most claim to capture 
organization pay mix, the differences in conceptualization and measurement inhibit to 
generalize the meaning and consequences of pay mix. 
 Following Kuhn (1962), we believe that the way a phenomenon is measured affects the 
results obtained and interpretation drawn. This is a particularly salient issue in compensation 
research because different approaches to pay mix measurement can take a number of 
theoretical (e.g., agency, expectancy, equity) and longitudinal (e.g., long-term, short-term) 
perspectives. We believe the perspective adopted affects measurement of pay mix employed, 
hypotheses derived, and interpretation of results observed. The principal contribution of this 
Organizational Pay Mix:  CAHRS WP 02-02 
 
 
Page 5 
study is to offer an evidence about the need of reexamining the meaning of pay mix. We 
classified the pay mix policies of 478 high-tech firms by cluster-analytic techniques using 
different pay mix measures, which resulted in unexpectedly dissimilar classifications. 
 
PAY MIX RESEARCH AND TOTAL COMPENSATION 
 Traditionally compensation research examining single forms of pay has drawn on several 
theories: agency theory (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1988), expectancy theory 
(Mowen, Middlemist, & Luther, 1981), organization justice theory (Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-
Mejia, 1995). In contrast, when it comes to pay mix, most studies use agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) as their theoretical perspective (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). Because agency theory discusses incentives can serve 
to align the interests of agents with those of principals, empirical studies generally use the 
relative importance of incentives as a proxy for the degree to which the compensation for the 
agents is linked to the principals' interest. 
 However, when we look into specific measures used in the past agency theory-based pay 
mix research, we notice employed pay forms disagree across studies. For numerator variables, 
some studies use an individual component of compensation such as bonus (e.g., Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987) and stock options (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000), and 
others use sets of pay forms such as long-term incentives (e.g., David, Kochlar, & Levits, 1998; 
Westphal & Zajac, 1995) and the sum of incentives (e.g., Montemayor, 1996; Roth & O'Donnell, 
1996). Different articles provide different rationales concerning their choice of numerator such 
as "although incentive pay takes a variety forms, bonuses are among the most common" 
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1998: 287), or "Compensation contingency was calculated for each year as 
the total value of long-term incentive grants divided by total compensation…. Short-term 
bonuses were not included in this measure because they are notoriously vulnerable to 
tampering" (Westphal & Zajac, 1995: 71). Concerning denominator variables, some use base 
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pay (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), and others use total pay (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
In general, past studies do not discuss the validity of employed pay mix measures very 
extensively, and some studies do not even discuss it. It is not clear from the past research how 
these different measures describe organization pay mix policy in a different way. 
Total compensation and pay mix 
 Another limitation of the past pay mix research is that it often fails to include the major 
components of total employee compensation package. For instance, past pay mix research 
continuously neglects benefits component although it is often discussed benefits are effective 
for attracting certain types of potential employees (Cable & Judge 1994; Lawler, 2000) and 
influencing employee behaviors (Martocchio, 1998). To fully understand the effects of employee 
compensation, researchers must take account of not only the relative importance of incentives 
but also that of base and benefits. In effect, we believe we can improve our knowledge of pay 
mix with more inclusive consideration of total compensation. Total compensation, defined as 
"the complete pay package including all forms of money, bonuses, benefits, services and stock" 
(Milkovich & Newman, 2002: 670), captures a more holistic and comprehensive view of 
employee compensation. 
 Once a total compensation perspective is adopted, we have the need to acknowledge the 
multidimensional aspects of organization pay mix. Let's take an example. The compensation 
packages of Firm A and Firm B are shown as ($70K, $3.5K, $50K, $20K) and ($60K $3K, $0, 
$25K) for (base pay, short-term incentives, long-term incentives, benefits). While the two firms 
indicate the same ratio of short-term incentives to base ($3.5K/$70 K = $3K/$60K = 0.05), 
clearly these two firms' pay mix policies are not the same; Firm A's pay mix has greater 
emphasis on long-term incentives relative to short-term incentives ($50K/$3.5K = 14.29 for Firm 
A, and $0/$3K = 0 for Firm B), less emphasis on benefits relative to base pay ($20K/$70K = 
0.29 for Firm A, and $25K/$60K = 0.42 for Firm B).  
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 This example demonstrates that relative importance of a single pay form does not fully 
capture an organization's pay mix policy. Nevertheless, virtually all past research looks at only a 
single aspect of pay mix ratio (an incentive form of pay divided by either base or total pay) or 
some exceptional cases two ratios (c.f. Anderson et al., 2000; Gomez-Mejia et al, 1987). Our 
study deals with a set of pay mix measures that capture multiple dimensions of pay mix 
simultaneously. Its advantage is shown in proceeding cluster analyses that offer us multi-
categorical classification of organization pay mix policy rather than dichotomous classification 
based on a single pay mix measure (e.g., whether the relative importance of incentive is high or 
not).  
 
RELEVANT THEORETIC MODELS AND THEIR PAY MIX IMPLICATIONS 
 This section explores alternative explanations for organization pay mix policy by 
examining several theoretic models relevant to compensation research. We begin our 
discussion with agency theory, and then we describe and analyze, expectancy theory, efficiency 
wage theory, equity theory, prospect theory, and person-organization fit model. In Table 1, we 
contrast the basic premises, key assumptions, and pay mix implications of these six theoretic 
models. 
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TABLE 1 
Theoretical Premises and Implications for Pay Mix  
Theory Basic premise Key assumptions Implication to pay mix 
Agency theory • Organization structures and human resource 
practices are developed to achieve an optimal 
contract under agency problems. 
• Principals choose either behavior-based contract or 
outcome-based contract considering the cost 
involved with the contracts. 
• Outcome-based pay aligns the interests of agents 
to those of principals. 
• Principals engage agents to perform 
some service in exchange for rewards. 
• Agents are self-interested and 
rational. Goal conflict between 
principals and agents. 
Difference in the attitudes toward risk 
between two actors (agents are more 
risk averse.) 
• Incentive alignment / outcome-based pay 
encourages the agents to work hard for 
achieving desired outcomes.  
• Relative importance of incentives affects 
employee motivation and organization 
performance.  
 
Expectancy 
theory 
• Motivation is a multiplicative function of (1) 
expectancy, (2) instrumentality, and (3) valence. 
• The greater the valence (pay level) the greater the 
motivation effects. 
• The greater the instrumentality (pay-performance 
link) the greater the motivation effects.  
• Individuals’ subjective estimates on 
the three perceptions determine the 
behavior. 
 
• Motivation effects may differ across pay 
forms because of the difference in 
instrumentality and personal preference. 
• The greater the level of each pay forms, 
the greater motivation effects, and the 
better the organization performance. 
Efficiency wage 
theory 
• Market position of pay matters. 
• Above-market pay level is associated with higher 
quality of employees, lower turn-over, and greater 
effort. 
• Individuals compare their pay with 
external job opportunity. 
• The higher the level of each pay forms 
measured in their market positions the 
better the organization performance. 
Equity theory • Individuals compare their input-outcome ratio with 
others’ 
• When individuals find their input-outcome ratio is 
not equal to the others’, they feel inequity.  
• Inequity negatively affects employee behavior and 
organization performance. 
• The strength of motivation is 
associated with individual perception 
of inequity. 
• Levels of each pay forms after controlling 
input level are associated with employee 
motivation and organization performance. 
 
Prospect theory • Individuals choose risk-averse behavior when the 
outcomes are framed in terms of potential gains, 
whereas they choose risk-taking behavior when the 
outcomes are framed in terms of potential loss. 
 
• Individual perceptions change their 
behaviors.  
• People change their attitudes toward 
risk. 
 
• Incentives work more effectively when it is 
framed in terms of positive rewards. 
• Not only the relative importance of 
incentive pay, but also the market position 
of total pay, influences employees’ 
attitudes and organizational performance.   
Person-
organization fit 
model 
• Certain pay characteristics (high pay level, flexible  
benefits, individual-based pay, and fixed pay) are 
more attractive to job candidates. 
• Pay systems have significant influence 
on attracting job candidates. 
• Individuals are risk averse. 
• The greater the relative importance of fixed 
pay the more effective in attracting job 
candidates.  The higher the level of total 
pay the more effective in attracting job 
candidates. 
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Agency Theory- Incentive Ratio.  Agency theory addresses how an optimal contract is 
achieved in situations in which principals delegate work to agents in exchange for rewards 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This theory focuses on two problems associated with this agency 
situation: (a) goal conflicts between the principals and agents, and (b) difference in their 
attitudes toward risks. Essentially, two alternatives are available for principals (behavior-based 
contract and outcome-based contract), and principals choose the lowest cost alternative. When 
principals can observe the agents’ actions easily at low cost, they choose behavior-based 
contract.  In this case, rewards are paid as salary (Eisenhardt, 1988). In contrast, when 
principals cannot monitor the agents actions at low cost, they choose an outcome-based 
contract, and rewards are paid as incentives designed to elicit actions that are linked to the 
desired outcomes. Since the rewards vary with performance, they transfer performance risk 
from principals to agents. The agents, who are assumed to be risk-averse accept such contracts 
only when adequate risk premiums are offered. 
 In the field of compensation, agency theory-based research has almost exclusively 
focused on the incentive forms of pay. Empirical studies typically apply this theory to the 
relationship between stockholders (principals) and top executives (agents), and examine the 
relative importance of incentive forms of pay in executive compensation. These studies often 
analyze organization performance as the consequence of the relative importance of incentives, 
testing the proposition that the grater the relative importance of incentives the greater the 
executives' efforts and the better the organization performance (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000; 
Gerhart & Milkovich, 1988). Although recent studies report several factors are influential to the 
relationship between incentives and performance such as governance structure (e.g., Werner & 
Tosi, 1995) and risk (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998), agency theory-based 
research presumes the greater emphasis on incentives influences agents' behaviors and 
organization performance. 
(Agency theory pay mix implication) 
 Relative importance of incentives is associated with organization performance. 
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Expectancy Theory – Absolute level.  Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) depicts motivation as 
a multiplicative function of (a) expectancy, the probability that effort leads to specific 
performance, (b) instrumentality, the probability that the performance leads to specific outcome, 
and (c) valence, the value of the specific outcome. The implication of this theory is employee 
compensation system motivates employees most effectively when employees believe "they can 
do what it takes to earn money and when they value money as a reward" (Bartol & Locke, 2000: 
111). As long as employees value money, the greater the pay level (valence), the greater is the 
motivation effects of the compensation system and the better organization performance. 
 Researchers using expectancy theory attribute distinct motivation effects of pay forms to 
the difference in their instrumentality (e.g., Mowen et al., 1981). For instance, pay forms that are 
variable and based on company-wide performance (e.g., bonus, profit sharing, stock options) 
may be associated with lower instrumentality (Bartol & Locke, 2000) as compared with the 
forms that are fixed or based on individual performance (e.g., merit pay, individual bonus). 
Further, when bonus and stock options are compared, the latter may have less instrumentality 
for non-managerial employees because stock prices are less controllable for lower level of 
employees. In addition to the difference in instrumentality, people may display different 
motivation levels in response to different pay forms since valence is based on individual 
perception. 
 Based on the notion that each form may be associated with a different instrumentality and 
valence, we argue researchers can understand the motivation effects of a compensation system 
based on expectancy framework when they analyze different pay forms separately. While 
agency theory suggests the ratio of different pay forms matters, expectancy theory suggests 
absolute level of each pay forms matters. We believe analyzing pay levels is not inconsistent 
with our pay mix framework if the levels of all forms are analyzed simultaneously since one can 
calculate any combinations of pay mix ratio if the levels of all pay forms are available. For 
instance, we know the absolute levels of each pay forms in the Firm A are ($70K, $3.5K, $50K, 
$20K) in the previous example, from which we can calculate any pay mix ratios in the Firm A.  
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 As we discussed, original expectancy theory implies pay level influences employee 
motivation and organization performance, and thus we posit that levels of each pay forms are 
associated with employee motivation and consequently with organization performance. 
(Expectancy theory pay mix implication) 
 Absolute levels of each pay forms are associated with organization performance. 
Efficiency Wage Theory – Market Position.  Efficiency wage theory (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984) 
discusses above-market wage is associated with increased efficiency, lower labor cost and 
employees' greater efforts to achieve organizational objectives. Its rationales are (a) above-
market wage attracts high quality applicants (Rynes & Boudreau, 1986), (b) greater opportunity 
cost of quitting encourages employees to stay in the organization (Levin, 1993), and (c) the risk 
of economic loss if fired due to shirking results in less shirking (Levin, Belman, Charness, 
Groshen, & O'Shughnessy, 2001). In spite of mixed empirical evidence about the effects on 
organization level performance (e.g., Levine, 1992; Pfeffer, Davis-Black, & Julius, 1995), 
efficiency wage theory essentially discusses the higher the market position the better the 
organization performance. In summary, using agency theory as the lens, pay level will be 
conceptualized in terms of its market position rather than its absolute value. 
 With regard to pay mix issue, past efficiency wage research is silent. This theory implicitly 
assumes employees aggregate different pay forms and compare the level of total pay with 
competing opportunities in the labor market. Thus, efficiency wage theory is ambiguous about 
the possible individual differences in employee perceptions of different pay forms. We argue it is 
likely that people assess the market positions of different pay forms separately (e.g., health care 
vs. bonuses). Some people may perceive one pay form's market position is more important than 
another pay form's market position for their job choice and effort level. Therefore, examining 
market positions of each pay forms separately will offer better understandings of organization 
pay mix policy. Consequently, we can posit market positions of each pay forms, rather than their 
absolute levels, are associated with organization performance. 
(Efficiency theory pay mix implication) 
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Market positions of each pay forms are associated with organization performance. 
Equity Theory – Levels after Controlling Base Pay or Total Pay.  Equity theory (Adams, 
1965) argues individuals compare the ratio of their outcomes (such as rewards) and inputs 
(such as effort, performance) with others' ratios. Those who find their ratio is not equal to those 
similar to them feel inequity, and take action to reduce it. The strength of motivation is 
associated with the magnitude of inequity, and the bigger the inequity the greater is the 
motivation to reduce it. In a compensation context, if employees perceive underpaid, they react 
negatively (Bretz & Thomas, 1992; Greenberg, 1990; Summers & Hendrix, 1991), and 
organization performance will be diminish.  
 Equity theory generally looks at compensation in terms of how much is paid rather than 
how it is paid. Indeed, we do not have any study that discusses pay mix from an equity theory 
perspective. Past equity theory studies focus on total pay, and fail to consider the possibility that 
people may evaluate different pay forms separately. We argue it is likely that employees 
calculate a set of ratios of separate pay forms, and thus researchers can have better 
understandings if equity comparison is framed according to each pay forms. 
 The difficulty of developing pay mix measures based on equity theory is to select input 
variables. Our study employs base pay and total pay for input variables because they are often 
strongly associated with the level of different pay forms (e.g., Dreher et al, 1988), and thus 
people plausibly have certain expectations on each pay forms based on base pay or total pay. 
Put differently, employees evaluate the levels of different pay forms after controlling the levels of 
their base pay or their total pay. We will describe how we control the levels of base pay and total 
pay to derive sets of pay mix measures in method section. 
(Equity theory pay mix implication) 
Levels of each pay forms after controlling base pay levels or total pay level are associated 
with organization performance. 
Prospect Theory – Incentive Ratio and Market Position of Total Pay.  While agency theory 
assumes agents or employees are always risk averse, prospect theory (Kahneman & Taversky, 
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1979) argues individuals change their attitudes toward risk according to projected gain and loss. 
Kahneman and Taversky (1979) show individuals choose risk-seeking behaviors when they are 
offered two alternatives whose outcomes are framed in terms of possible loss, whereas they 
choose risk-averse behaviors when they are offered two alternatives whose outcomes are both 
framed in terms of possible gains. 
 Compensation research has long been viewed outcome-based incentives as pay "at risk," 
because they transfer organization performance risk from employers to employees. In agency 
theory, agents are assumed to be risk-averse, and therefore they try to avoid outcome-based 
incentives. In prospect theory framework, however individuals change their attitudes toward 
outcome-based compensation depending on how it is framed. Specifically, Bartol (1999) 
suggests outcome-based incentives may lead to higher performance when it is framed in terms 
of positive rewards since it leads to greater persistence in spite of obstacles. 
 If positive framework affects the effectiveness of outcome-based incentives, a measure 
associated with employees' framework needs to be included in pay mix research. Kahneman 
and Taversky (1977) suggest employees change their framework when their total pay 
surpasses their expected income level. We think market level of total pay indicates potential 
income level available outside the organization, and thus is a reasonable estimates of the 
employees' expectation of their income. Consequently, we argue employees change their 
framework considering the market position of their total pay. In summary, prospect theory posits 
the combination of greater relative importance of incentive pay and above-market total pay is 
associated with greater motivation effects and better organization performance. 
(Prospect theory pay mix implication) 
Relative importance of incentives and the market position of total pay are associated with 
organization performance. 
Person-Organization Fit Model –Fixed Pay Ratio and Level of Total Pay. Cable and Judge 
(1994) discuss people's preferences to pay influences their job choice decisions. They show 
that compensation system characterized by (a) high pay level, (b) flexible benefits, (c) 
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individual-based pay, and (d) fixed pay policies is more attractive to job seekers. A 
straightforward implication of this model is that greater relative importance of fixed pay is more 
attractive to job applicants. According to Cable and Judge, fixed pay policies are more attractive 
because job applicants are risk-averse, and are unwilling to accept variable pay, which is often 
influenced by unstable factors rather than their own efforts (e.g., economic climate). Because 
Cable and Judge focused on fixed pay and contingent pay as a whole, we will examine the 
relative importance of total fixed pay to total pay rather than looking at different pay forms 
separately. 
 In addition, because Cable and Judge show that high total pay level is more attractive to 
job candidates, we include the level of total pay variable. The other characteristics (flexible 
benefits and individual-based pay) are not included due to irrelevance to organization pay mix. 
In short, the implication of person-organization fit model is that the relative importance of fixed 
pay and the level of total pay are associated with the attractiveness of compensation systems to 
job candidates. Human resource systems with greater attractiveness to job seekers enable the 
company to employ job candidates with higher human capital, and these companies can be 
more productive. 
(Person-Organization fit model pay mix implication) 
Levels of total pay and relative importance of fixed pay are associated with organization 
performance. 
 
PAY MIX MEASURE DEVELOPMENT 
Categorizing Pay Forms 
 Compensation researchers consistently categorize pay components into base pay, 
incentives, and benefits. Base pay is the cash compensation that is fixed and “tends to reflect 
the value of the work or skills" (Milkovich & Newman, 2002: 654). Incentives are pay forms that 
change according to performance, but are not added to base pay. Incentives can take both cash  
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form (e.g., bonus, profit sharing) and non-cash form (e.g., stock options, stock grants), but are 
paid directly to employees. Benefits are non-cash compensation paid indirectly to employees 
(e.g., insurance, perquisite). 
 While some studies develop a category of total incentives (e.g., Roth & O'Donnell; 1996; 
Montemayor, 1996), past pay mix research usually distinguishes bonus from long-term 
incentives (e.g., Anderson et al. 2000; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Our study also makes 
distinction between bonus and long-term incentives because: (1) bonus is generally paid in cash 
(Milkovich & Newman, 2002), (2) the amount is based on individual and/or group performance 
(Sturman & Short; 2000), and  (3) it is paid annually or more frequently (Martocchio, 1998; 
Milkovich & Newman, 2002), whereas long-term incentives are: (1) generally paid in equity form 
(Milkovich & Newman, 2002), (2) whose amount is generally based on stock price, and (3) it 
takes multiple years for employees to earn them. Distinction between bonus and long-term 
incentives is particularly important for agency theory, expectancy theory, and prospect theory. 
Agency theory and prospect theory posit that employees’ perception of risk affects their 
behaviors, and bonus and long-term incentives are distinct in their inherent risks (Gerhart, 2000). 
Expectancy theory states instrumentality influences the strength of motivation, and the 
perceived instrumentality will be different between bonus and long-term incentives as we 
already discussed.  
 We included other short-term cash incentives such as profit sharing award, and develop a 
category of short-term incentives. Eventually, we categorized pay forms into base pay, short-
term incentives (STI), long-term incentives (LTI), and benefits.  
Pay Mix Measures 
Agency theory.  Agency theory's implications to pay mix research is that greater relative 
importance of incentive pay is associated with better organization performance. As we 
discussed, we believe capturing multi-dimensional aspects of pay mix will give us more accurate 
view of organization pay mix, and therefore the measures included not only the relative 
importance of incentives but also those of base pay and benefits. Concerning denominator 
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variables, past research uses either base pay (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Werner & Tosi, 
1995) or total pay (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Since significant results are generally 
provided for both types of denominators, we developed two sets of pay mix measures: one with 
the denominator of base pay, and the other with the denominator of total pay. 
(Agency theory based pay mix measures 1)  
  STI/Base pay, LTI/Base pay, and Benefits/Base pay. 
(Agency theory based pay mix measures 2) 
  Base pay/Total pay, STI/Total pay, LTI/Total pay, and Benefits/Total pay. 
Expectancy theory.  The implication of expectancy theory to pay mix research is that the levels 
of each pay forms are associated with employee motivation and organization performance. The 
set of pay mix measures consists of the levels of each pay forms. Consistent with prior research, 
each measure is transformed into natural logarithm to correct non-normal distribution. 
(Expectancy theory-based pay mix measures)  
ln (base pay), ln (STI), ln (LTI), and ln (Benefits). 
Efficiency wage theory.  Efficiency wage theory implies that market positions of each pay 
forms are associated with organization performance. To get the indices that show market 
position of each pay forms, we standardized the levels of each pay forms using the means and 
standard deviations of company-mean pay level. 
(Efficiency theory based pay mix measures)  
Base pay (market position), STI (market position), LTI (market position), and Benefits (market position). 
Equity theory.  Equity theory implies that the levels of each pay forms after controlling either 
base pay or total pay are associated with organization performance. To develop sets of pay mix 
measures, we ran two regressions: (1) one which regressed three forms of pay (STI, LTI, and 
benefits) on base pay, and (2) one which regressed four forms of pay (base pay, STI, LTI, and 
benefits) on total pay. The results of the regressions showed all the coefficients were significant 
in p < 0.05 level. Then, we calculated and standardized the residuals (actual values - estimated 
values) of each pay forms, which will be used as equity theory based pay mix measures.  
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(Equity theory based pay mix measures 1 - controlling base pay)  
STI (Base pay), LTI (Base pay), and Benefits (Base pay). 
(Equity theory based pay mix measures 2 - controlling total pay)  
Base pay (Total pay), STI (Total pay), LTI (Total pay), and Benefits (Total pay). 
Prospect theory.  Prospect theory implies relative importance of incentives and market position 
of total pay is associated with organization performance. The corresponding sets of pay mix 
measures are those that combine the pay mix measures developed in agency theory framework 
with a measure associated with the market position of total pay. For calculating the market 
position of total pay, we standardized the level total pay. 
(Prospect theory based pay mix measures 1)  
Total pay (market position), STI/Base pay, LTI/Base pay, and Benefits/Base pay. 
(Prospect theory based pay mix measures 2)  
Total pay (market position), Base pay/Total pay, STI/Total pay, LTI/Total pay, and 
Benefits/Total pay. 
Person-organization fit model.  Person-organization fit model implies the level of total pay and 
relative importance of fixed pay are associated with attractiveness of compensation system for 
job seekers and subsequent organization performance. As we included the relative importance 
of base pay and benefits in agency theory-based pay mix measures, we included not only the 
relative importance of fixed pay, but also that of variable pay. We developed fixed pay and 
variable pay variables by combining base pay and benefits, and STI and LTI, respectively. 
Concerning pay level variables, we decided to use the actual pay level because Cable and 
Judge (1994) used actual amount in their experimental study. 
(Person-organization fit model pay mix measures)  
Total pay, Fixed pay/Total pay, and Contingent pay/Total pay. 
 Consequently, we developed nine sets of pay mix measures based on six theoretic 
models (agency theory – 2, expectancy theory – 1, efficiency wage theory – 1, equity theory – 2, 
prospect theory – 2, person-organization fit model – 1). 
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METHODS 
Data  
 The data were drawn from SC/CHiPS compensation survey compiled by Clark/Bardes, 
formally known as Executive Alliance. The compensation data contains employee compensation 
data below executive level as well as the information such as employee job classification, job 
level, office location for 760 companies in high-tech industry (computer, networking, 
semiconductor, software, internet/telecom, electronic manufacturing, etc.) for the years 1994 
through 1999.  Compensation data for 1997 though 1999 are composed of individual 
compensation data (931,235 individual compensation data from 464 companies), while the data 
for 1994 though 1996 are already aggregated into job level (38,477 job level compensation data 
from 296 companies) with the information on the number of employees in each job levels. The 
value of stock options was calculated using Black-Scholes model. Benefits were valued as the 
cost if an employee purchases equivalent in the marketplace. 
 
Aggregation to Organization Level Pay Mix Data 
 Because we are interested in organization pay mix policy, we first aggregated job-level 
data (1994-1996) and individual level data (1997-1999) into company level data by taking 
means. Job level data were weighted by the number of employees in the job levels. These 
compensation data were adjusted by consumer price index (CPI). 
 While variance in pay mix across employees within an organization may differ across 
companies, our analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows significant amount of variances of pay mix 
measures are explained by company differences. For example, the ANOVA of Agency 2 pay 
mix measures (Base pay/Total pay, STI/Total pay, LTI/Total pay, Benefits/Total pay) for 
individual employees using the 1997-1999 data shows these measures are significantly different 
across companies (F = 3524.16, 3211.75, 2800.02, and 2938.93, respectively, which are all 
p<0.001 level. df = 284).  
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 Using the data set spanning 6 years, we created a panel data set. Because all the 
companies did not participate in the survey every year, the compensation data for 478 samples 
were eventually available for our analyses. The number of companies that were actually 
included in the data set was 159. 
Cluster Analysis 
 Next step is to examine how nine sets of pay mix measures classify organization pay mix 
using cluster analyses. When running nine cluster analyses, we imposed a restriction about the 
number of clusters so that we could calculate agreement of cluster solutions by Cohen's kappa. 
Calculation of kappa requires two variables to have the same number of categories, and 
therefore we first had to decide the number of clusters applied to all the cluster analyses. We 
recognize an appropriate number of clusters is variable when we run cluster analyses using 
different variables. However, we believe restricting the number of clusters is a necessary 
compromise because a part of our study’s goal is to examine the degree to which different pay 
mix measures classify organization pay mix differently. 
 To determine the number of clusters applied to all cluster analyses, we first cluster 
analyzed Agency1 pay mix measures (STI/Base pay, LTI/Base pay, Benefits/Base pay). We 
chose these measures because STI/Base pay is one of the most commonly used pay mix 
measures (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Werner & Tosi, 1995), and we were interested in 
comparing the cluster solutions calculated from a set of conventional measures with those 
calculated from contrasting sets of measures. We first ran a hierarchical cluster analysis on 
Agency1 pay mix measures with 5 most popular agglomerative algorithms: single linkage, 
complete linkage, average linkage, centroid method, and Ward's method (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1998; Kethen, & Shook, 1996). Khattree and Naik (2000) suggest researchers 
can use R-square, root mean square standard deviation (RMSSTD), and semi partial R-square 
(SPRSQ) to assess the quality of clustering and determine the appropriate number of clusters. 
A large value of R-square is desirable while RMSSTD and SPRSQ should be small. When we 
examined these measures, we found similar patterns across five analyses using different 
Organizational Pay Mix:  CAHRS WP 02-02 
 
 
Page 20 
agglomerative algorithms. Specifically, R-square dropped substantially when the number of 
clusters fell from three to two, and RMSSTD and SPRSQ were satisfactorily smaller when the 
number of clusters were three. From these analyses, we concluded a three-cluster solution was 
to be optimal for the analysis using a set of Agency1 pay mix measures. Consequently, we 
decided to use a three-cluster model in all subsequent cluster analyses. For all the sets of pay 
mix variables derived from different theories (including Agency1 pay mix variables), we used k-
means cluster method with specifying a three cluster solution (therefore, k = 3). 
 When we cluster analyzed using ratio variables and pay level variables simultaneously 
(Prospect 1, Prospect2, and Person-organization fit model), we standardized all the variables 
because variables measured in larger scale affect cluster solutions more strongly (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). As a result of standardization, the level of total pay variable 
in Person-organization fit model became identical to the market position of total pay. 
 
RESULT 
Classification of Organization Pay mix 
  Table 2 contains a summary of descriptive statistics for pay mix variables and 
organization performance variables. It shows some pay mix variables are highly correlated with 
each other, but others are not. Table 3 summarizes the final mean value of each pay mix 
measures assigned to each clusters. Table 4 describes how different pay mix measures 
classified organization pay mix policies. 
 In the results of cluster analysis using Agency1 measures, the first cluster consists large 
portion of our samples (402 companies). These companies indicate very small ratio for both the 
ratio of STI to base pay (0.05) and that of LTI to base pay (0.06). This result is somewhat 
surprising to us because our sample consists of high-tech companies and it is often described 
these companies use stock options for compensating their employees more aggressively 
(Anderson et al, 2000). The second cluster includes 68 companies whose ratio of STI to base 
pay (0.09) is higher than the companies in cluster 1, and the ratio of LTI to base pay is 
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moderately higher (0.56). The third cluster consists of only 8 companies. Their ratio of STI to 
base pay (0.05) is the same as that of cluster 1, but indicates substantially high ratio of LTI to 
base pay (1.49). Because the ratio of benefits to base pay does not differ substantially across 
clusters (0.26 for cluster1, and 0.25 for cluster 2 and 3), we summarize that the cluster analysis 
using Agency1 pay mix measures classify companies to either (1) weak emphasis on STI and 
LTI (cluster1), (2) strong emphasis on STI and moderate emphasis on LTI (cluster2), or (3) 
weak emphasis on STI and strong emphasis on LTI (cluster3). 
 The result of cluster analysis based on Agency2 pay mix variables displays somewhat 
different classifications of organization pay mix policy. Companies in cluster 1 (358 companies) 
rely heavily on base pay (75% of total compensation is paid as base pay) and benefits (19%). 
Instead, they use incentives little (3% for both STI and LTI). Companies in cluster2 (84 
companies) indicate the highest STI (6%) and moderately higher LTI (18%). Cluster3, which 
includes 36 companies that have weak emphasis on base pay (44%) and benefits (11%), but 
use LTI much more extensively (40%). In summary, the cluster analysis using Agency2 pay mix 
variables classify companies to either (1) strong emphasis on base pay and benefits (cluster1), 
(2) strong emphasis on STI and moderate emphasis on LTI (cluster2), or (3) weak emphasis on 
base pay and benefits, and strong emphasis on LTI  (cluster3).  
 In a similar vein, the analysis using expectancy theory pay mix variables classified 
companies into either (1) the levels of all pay forms are the lowest (cluster1, 247 companies), 
(2) STI and benefits are the highest and the level of LTI is moderate (cluster2, 117 companies), 
or (3) the levels of base and LTI are the highest and the level of STI is moderate (cluster3, 114 
companies). The analysis using Efficiency wage theory measures classified companies into 
either (1) all pay forms lag from the market (cluster1, 432 companies), (2) the level of STI 
substantially leads the market and LTI and benefits lead the market moderately (cluster2, 6 
companies), or (3) all pay forms lead the market; base pay and STI lead the market moderately 
and LTI substantially leads the market (cluster3, 40 companies). 
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 The results of the other cluster analyses are as follows. Analysis using Equity1 measures 
classified companies into either (1) low STI and LTI after controlling base pay level (cluster1, 
226 companies), (2) high STI, LTI, and benefits after controlling base pay level (cluster2, 134 
companies), or (3) high LTI but low benefits after controlling base pay level (cluster3, 118 
companies). Companies were classified by the analysis using Equity2 pay mix measures into 
either (1) high base pay and benefits, and low LTI after controlling total pay level (cluster1, 236 
companies), (2) low STI and moderately high LTI after controlling total pay level (cluster2, 127 
companies), or (3) low base pay and benefits but high STI and LTI after controlling total pay 
level (cluster3, 115 companies). Analysis using Prospect1 pay mix measures classified 
companies into either (1) weak emphasis on STI and LTI with lagging total pay (cluster1, 446 
companies), (2) strong emphasis on STI and benefits with leading total pay (cluster2, 6 
companies), or (3) strong emphasis on LTI with substantially leading total pay (cluster3, 26 
companies). Similarly, the analysis using Prospect2 pay mix measures classify companies into 
either (1) weak emphasis on STI and LTI with lagging total pay(cluster1, 420 companies), (2) 
strong emphasis on STI with leading total pay (cluster2, 14 companies), or (3) strong emphasis 
on LTI and weak emphasis on benefits with substantially leading total pay (cluster3, 44 
companies). Finally, pay mix measures based on Person-organization fir model resulted in 
classifications of (1) strong emphasis on fixed pay with lagging total pay (cluster1, 355 
companies), (2) moderately weak emphasis on fixed pay with moderately leading total pay 
(cluster2, 110 companies), and (3) weak emphasis on fixed pay with substantially leading total 
pay (cluster 3, 13 companies). In short, our analyses suggest the cluster analyses using 
different sets of pay mix variables capture somewhat different aspects of organization pay mix. 
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Table 2
Correlations of Pay Mix Variables
Variables Mean s.d. *1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 32 33 35 36 37
Agency theory 1
1.  STI / Base pay 0.06 0.07
2.  LTI / Base pay 0.16 0.27 .18
3.  Benefits / Base pay 0.26 0.06 .21 -.08
Agency theory 2
4.  Base pay / Total pay 0.70 0.10 -.49 -.87 -.26
5.  STI / Total pay 0.04 0.04 .96 .05 .19 -.38
6.  LTI / Total pay 0.08 0.12 .17 .97 -.13 -.88 .05
7.  Benefits / Total pay 0.18 0.04 -.12 -.59 .82 .33 -.06 -.64
Expectancy theory
8.  Logarithm of base pay 4.25 0.13 .02 .08 -.11 -.09 .03 .13 -.14
9.  Logarithm of STI *2 1.29 0.82 .84 .19 .20 -.51 .90 .21 -.11 .15
10. Logarithm of LTI *2 1.57 1.37 .23 .80 -.15 -.80 .12 .90 -.61 .24 .27
11. Logarithm of benefits 2.86 0.27 .18 -.03 .85 -.28 .17 -.05 .67 .41 .24 -.00
Efficiency wage theory
12. Market position of base pay 0.00 1.00 .02 .08 -.14 -.09 .03 .13 -.17 .99 .15 .25 .38
13. Market position of STI 0.00 1.00 .99 .18 .19 -.49 .96 .17 -.12 .13 .86 .24 .22 .12
14. Market position of LTI 0.00 1.00 .17 .99 -.10 -.86 .04 .96 -.59 .15 .19 .80 -.01 .15 .17
15. Market position of benefits 0.00 1.00 .21 -.05 .88 -.28 .20 -.07 .69 .36 .27 -.03 .98 .34 .24 -.02
Equity theory 1
16. STI after controlling base pay *3 0.00 1.00 .85 .18 .22 -.50 .90 .19 -.09 .00 .99 .24 .18 .00 .85 .17 .22
17. LTI after controlling base pay *3 0.00 1.00 .23 .80 -.12 -.80 .12 .89 -.60 .00 .25 .97 -.11 .00 .21 .79 -.12 .25
18. Benefits after controlling base pay *3 0.00 1.00 .19 -.07 .98 -.27 .17 -.11 .80 .00 .20 -.11 .91 -.03 .18 -.08 .91 .20 -.12
Equity theory 2
19. Base pay after controllin total pay *3 0.00 1.00 -.29 -.53 -.23 .56 -.20 -.48 .12 .77 -.17 -.31 .18 .76 -.19 -.46 .14 -.29 .51 -.15
20. STI after controlling total pay *3 0.00 1.00 .76 -16 .18 -.16 .86 -.15 .05 -.15 .90 -.06 .06 -.14 .75 -.17 .11 .93 .03 .14 -.19
21. LTI after controlling total pay *3 0.00 1.00 -.07 .36 -.34 -.29 -.14 .49 -.51 -.35 -.08 .67 -.48 -.34 .12 .33 -.49 -.03 .78 -.37 -.46 -.09
22. Benefits after controlling total pay *3 0.00 1.00 .02 -.38 .89 .07 .05 -.42 .91 .15 .06 -.35 .91 .13 .04 -.37 .90 .04 -.40 .92 .20 .07 -.53
Prospect theory 1
23. STI / Base pay *3 0.00 1.00 1.00 .18 .21 -.49 .96 .17 -.12 .02 .84 .23 .18 .02 .99 .17 .21 .85 .23 .19 -.29 .76 -.07 .02
24. LTI / Base pay *3 0.00 1.00 .18 1.00 -.08 -.87 .05 .97 -.59 .08 .19 .80 -.03 .08 .18 .99 -.05 .18 .80 -.07 -.53 -.16 .36 -.38 .18
25. Beneifts / Base pay *3 0.00 1.00 .21 -.08 1.00 -.26 .19 -.13 .82 -.11 .20 -.15 .85 -.14 .19 -.10 .88 .22 -.12 .98 -.23 .18 -.34 .89 .21 -.08
26. Market position of total pay 0.00 1.00 .36 .82 .07 -.84 .26 .81 -.42 .55 .41 .75 .34 .56 .41 .86 .32 .33 .63 .13 -.10 -.02 .03 -.08 .36 .82 .07
Prospect theory 1
27. Base pay / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 -.49 -.87 -.26 1.00 -.38 -.88 .33 -.09 -.51 -.80 -.28 -.09 -.49 -.86 -.28 -.50 -.80 -.27 .56 -.16 -.29 .07 -.49 -.87 -.26 -.84
28. STI / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 .96 .05 .19 -.38 1.00 .05 -.06 .03 .90 .12 .17 .03 .96 .04 .20 .90 .12 .17 -.20 .86 -.14 .05 .96 .05 .19 .26 -.38
29. LTI / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 .17 .97 -.13 -.88 .05 1.00 -.64 .13 .21 .90 -.05 .13 .17 .96 -.07 .19 .89 -.11 -.48 -.15 .49 -.42 .17 .97 -.13 .81 -.88 .05
30. Beneifts / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 -.12 -.59 .82 .33 -.06 -.64 1.00 -.14 -.11 -.61 .67 -.17 -.13 -.59 .69 -.10 -.60 .80 .12 .05 -.51 .91 -.12 -.59 .82 -.42 .33 -.06 -.64
31. Market position of total pay (Same as 26.)
Person-orgnaization fit model
32.Fixed pay / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 -.45 -.93 .07 .94 -.34 -.96 .62 -.13 -.46 -.88 .00 -.13 -.45 -.92 .01 -.44 -.87 .06 .51 -.12 -.42 .38 -.45 -.93 .07 -.84 .94 -.34 -.96 .62
33. Variable pay / Total pay *3 0.00 1.00 .45 .93 -.07 -.94 .34 .96 -.62 .13 .46 .88 -.00 .13 .45 .92 -.01 .44 .87 -.06 -.51 .12 .42 -.38 .45 .93 -.07 .84 -.94 .34 .96 -.62 -1.00
34. Total pay *3 (Same as 26.)
Performance measures
35. ROA 3.89 10.20 .29 .24 .09 -.33 .29 .24 -.11 -.08 .33 .17 .04 -.08 .28 .23 .05 .35 .20 .08 -.27 .28 .04 -.05 .29 .24 .09 .21 -.33 .29 .24 -.11 -.31 .31
36. ROE 6.40 74.32 .01 .06 .12 -.09 -.01 .06 .07 -.13 .04 .03 .04 -.14 -.02 .05 .06 .06 .07 .11 -.16 .05 .07 .05 .01 .06 .12 -.00 -.09 -.01 .06 .07 -.05 .05 .40
37. TSR 1.25 0.59 .20 .21 .09 -.28 .21 .21 -.07 -.02 .26 .18 .10 .02 .21 .22 .11 .26 .18 .10 -.16 .18 .02 .00 .20 .21 .09 .24 -.28 .21 .21 -.07 -.26 .26 .44 .20
38. Revenue growth 0.19 0.33 .13 .36 -.13 -.32 .11 .36 -.30 -.14 .11 .27 -.17 -.13 .12 .35 -.18 .13 .32 -.13 -.32 .04 .22 -.27 .13 .36 -.13 .22 -.32 .11 .36 -.30 -.37 .37 .47 .21 .30
*1. For the pay mix variables (from 1 through 25), N = 478. Correlations greater than .09 are significant at p = .05, and correlations exceeding .12 are significant at p = .01.
*2. Added 1 to original values before log transformation
*3. Standardized
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TABLE 3
Results of 3-Means Cluster Analyses with Different Sets of Pay Mix Measures
Agency theory 1 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Equity theory 2 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
STI / Base pay 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.05 Base pay after controlling tota 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.19 -1.06
LTI / Base pay 0.16 0.27 0.06 0.56 1.49 STI after controlling total pay 0.00 1.00 0.27 -1.03 0.58
Benefits / Base pay 0.26 0.06 0.26 0.25 0.25 LTI after controlling total pay 0.00 1.00 -0.72 0.49 0.93
Number of firms 478 478 402 68 8 Benefits after controlling total 0.00 1.00 0.54 -0.37 -0.70
Number of firms 478 478 236 127 115
Agency theory 2 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
Base pay / Total pay 0.70 0.10 0.75 0.61 0.44 Prospect theory 1 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
STI / Total pay 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 STI / Base pay * 0.00 1.00 -0.09 5.30 0.33
LTI / Total pay 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.40 LTI / Base pay * 0.00 1.00 -0.20 0.66 3.30
Benefits / Total pay 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.11 Benefits / Base pay* 0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.60 -0.05
Number of firms 478 478 358 84 36 Market position of total pay 0.00 1.00 -0.17 1.34 2.66
Number of firms 478 478 446 6 26
Expectancy theory Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
logarithm of base pay 4.25 0.13 4.22 4.28 4.29 Prospect theory 2 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
logarithm of STI 1.29 0.82 0.92 2.03 1.32 Base pay /Total pay* 0.00 1.00 0.28 -1.38 -2.21
logarithm of LTI 1.57 1.37 0.48 2.10 3.37 STI / Total pay* 0.00 1.00 -0.11 3.29 -0.02
logarithm of benefits 2.86 0.27 2.83 2.95 2.83 LTI / Total pay* 0.00 1.00 -0.27 0.26 2.51
Number of firms 478 478 247 117 114 Benefits / Total pay* 0.00 1.00 0.16 -0.22 -1.49
Market position of Total pay 0.00 1.00 -0.25 0.90 2.14
Efficiency wage theory Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Number of firms 478 478 420 14 44
Market position of base pay 0.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.08 0.58
Market position of STI 0.00 1.00 -0.10 5.17 0.33 Person-organization fit Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
Market position of LTI 0.00 1.00 -0.25 0.44 2.62 Fix pay / Total pay* 0.00 1.00 0.49 -1.20 -3.20
Market position of benefits 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.90 0.07 Variable pay / Total pay* 0.00 1.00 -0.49 1.20 3.20
Number of firms 478 478 432 6 40 Total pay* 0.00 1.00 -0.42 0.93 3.51
Number of firms 478 478 355 110 13
Equity theory 1 Mean s.d Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3
STI after controlling base pay*0.00 1.00 -0.56 0.93 0.02
LTI after controlling base pay 0.00 1.00 -0.68 0.60 0.62 * Pay mix measures are standardized.
Benefits after controlling base 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.74 -1.14
Number of firms 478 478 226 134 118
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TABLE 4 
Empirical Organization Pay Mix Policies 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Agency theory 1 (Incentive ratio) 
Cluster 1: Weak emphasis on short-term incentives (STI) and long-term incentives (LTI). 
Cluster 2: Strong emphasis on STI and moderate emphasis on LTI. 
Cluster 3: Weak emphasis on STI and strong emphasis on LTI. 
 
Agency theory 2 (Incentive ratio) 
Cluster 1: Strong emphasis on base pays and benefits. 
Cluster 2: Strong emphasis on STI and moderate emphasis on LTI. 
Cluster 3: Weak emphasis on base pay and benefits and strong emphasis on LTI. 
 
Expectancy theory (Absolute level) 
Cluster 1: Low pay levels for all forms. 
Cluster 2: High STI and benefits, and moderate LTI. 
Cluster 3: Moderate STI and high LTI. 
 
Efficiency wage theory (Market position) 
Cluster 1: Lagging from the market for all forms. 
Cluster 2: Substantially leading STI, and moderately leading LTI and benefits. 
Cluster 3: Leading the market for all forms; moderately reading base pay and STI, and 
substantially leading LTI. 
 
Equity theory 1 (Level after controlling base pay) 
Cluster 1: Low STI and LTI after controlling base pay level. 
Cluster 2: High STI, LTI, and benefits after controlling base pay level. 
Cluster 3: High LTI and low benefits after controlling base pay level. 
 
Equity theory 2 (Level after controlling total pay) 
Cluster 1: High base pay and benefits, and low LTI after controlling total pay level. 
Cluster 2: Low STI and moderately high LTI after controlling total pay level. 
Cluster 3: Low base pay and benefits, and high STI and LTI after controlling total pay level. 
 
Prospect theory 1 (Incentive ratio and level of total pay) 
Cluster 1: Weak emphasis on STI and LTI with lagging total pay. 
Cluster 2: Strong emphasis on STI and benefits with leading total pay. 
Cluster 3: Strong emphasis on LTI with substantially leading total pay. 
 
Prospect theory 2 (Incentive ratio and level of total pay) 
Cluster 1: Weak emphasis on STI and LTI with lagging total pay. 
Cluster 2: Strong emphasis on STI with leading total pay. 
Cluster 3: Strong emphasis on LTI and weak emphasis on base pay with substantially 
leading total pay. 
 
Person-organization fit model (Fixed pay ratio and level of total pay) 
Cluster 1: Strong emphasis on fixed pay with lagging total pay. 
Cluster 2: Moderately weak emphasis on fixed pay with moderately leading total pay. 
Cluster 3: Weak emphasis on fixed pay substantially leading total pay. 
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Agreement of Cluster Solutions  
 Next, we calculated Cohen's kappa to investigate the degree to which the cluster solutions 
derived from different sets of pay mix measures agree with each others. Table 5 shows the 
Cohen's kappa across cluster solutions. Cohen's kappa is equal to 1 if perfect agreement 
occurs, and it is equal to 0 if the agreement is merely equal to that expected under 
independence (Agresti, 1996). We calculated kappa statistics of all the possible combinations of 
two cluster solutions (3! = 6), and reported the maximum values.  
 While all the kappa statistics are significant in p<0.05 level, the statistics ranges very 
widely. First we compared the agreement of two most frequently used sets of pay mix measures 
(Agency1 and Agency2). Their maximum value of kappa statistics is 0.46, which is moderately 
high as compared with kappa statistics of the other combinations. The cluster solutions based 
on Agency1 pay mix measures agree strongly with the solutions based on Efficiency wage 
theory (kappa = 0.57), Prospect theory2 (0.58), and Person-organization fit model (0.67) pay 
mix measures. In contrast, they show lower agreement with the solutions based on Equity 
theory1 (kappa = 0.20) and Equity theory2 (0.20) pay mix measures. Similarly, the solutions 
based on Agency2 pay mix measures agree strongly with Prospect theory2 (kappa = 0.50) and 
Person-organization fit model (0.82) pay mix measures, but weakly with Equity theory1 (0.20) 
pay mix measures. 
 Cluster solutions derived from Expectancy theory pay mix measures agree most strongly 
with cluster solutions derived from Equity theory1 pay mix measures (kappa = 0.52). Cluster 
solutions derived from Efficiency wage theory pay mix measures agree strongly with cluster 
solutions derived from Prospect theory1 (kappa = 0.78) and Prospect theory 2 (0.79) pay mix 
measures. Two cluster solutions derived from sets of equity theory pay mix measures (Equity1 
and Equity2) indicate low agreement with each other (kappa = 0.24). The low agreement of two 
cluster solutions derived from the same theoretical framework but using different pay measures 
suggests that not only how pay mix is conceptualized, but also how it is measured can influence 
classification of organization pay mix policy. In contrast, the solutions derived from sets of two 
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prospect theory pay mix measures (Prospect1 and Prospect2) agree strongly (kappa = 0.69). 
Cluster solutions derived from Person-organization fit model agree strongly with the solutions 
derived from both sets of agency theory pay mix measures (kappa = 0.67 and 0.82).  
 Although not reported here, we also ran cluster analyses with specifying the number of 
clusters for two (k = 2) and four (k = 4) using the same sets of pay mix measures. Calculated 
kappa statistics are generally lower than our original statistics reported in Table 5 (k =3). In 
summary, our analysis confirms our discussion that theoretic model of pay mix matters. Even if 
the same theoretic model is used, employing different  measures can result in dissimilar 
classification of organization pay mix policy as we see in the low agreement between two sets of 
equity theory pay mix measures. 
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TABLE 5
Kappa Measure of Agreement across Different Measures
Agency Agency Expectancy Efficiency wage Equity Equity Prospect Prospect
Theory 1 Theory 2 Theory Theory Theory 1 Theory 2 Theory 1 Theory 2
Agency
Theory 1
Agency 0.46
Theory 2
Expectancy 0.33 0.38
Theory
Efficiency wage 0.57 0.41 0.23
Theory
Equity 0.20 0.31 0.52 0.13
Theory 1
Equity 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.24
Theory 2
Prospect 0.38 0.37 0.17 0.78 0.09 0.08
Theory 1
Prospect 0.58 0.50 0.28 0.79 0.17 0.11 0.69
Theory 2
Person-Org. 0.67 0.82 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.42 0.27
Fit Model
1.  All the Kappa statistics are significant in p < 0.05 level.
2.  Statistics shown in this table are maximum values
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Performance Difference across Clusters 
 Because all the theoretic models we discussed for developing pay mix measures are more 
or less concerned with increased organization performance, we examined how organization 
performance varies across companies in different clusters. As is the case with pay mix 
measures, what measurement we use for organization performance is influenced by what 
theoretical perspective we use (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Since it is beyond our 
intention to discuss what performance measure is appropriate in pay mix research, we chose 
four frequently used organization level performance measures: return on asset (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), total shareholders’ return (TSR), and revenue growth. These data were collected 
from COMPUSTAT. 
 Table 6 shows the means of ROA, ROE, TSR, and revenue growth for companies in each 
clusters. We also conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA) to check if these performance 
measures are statistically different across clusters. Concerning the cluster solutions derived 
from Agency1 pay mix measures, ROA, TSR, and revenue growth are significantly different 
across clusters, whereas ROE is not. Companies in cluster 3, characterized by weak emphasis 
on STI and strong emphasis on LTI surpass the performance of companies in cluster 1, 
characterized as weak emphasis on STI and LTI, in terms of ROA (p =  0.005 in pooled t-test), 
TSR (p = 0.023), and revenue growth (p < 0.001). On the other hand, the differences in 
performance measures between cluster 3 and cluster 2, which are characterized as strong 
emphasis on STI and moderate emphasis on LTI, are all insignificant (p = 0.371 for ROA, p = 
0.751 for ROE, p = 0.238 for TSR, and p = 0.080 for revenue growth). Thus, cluster analysis 
using Agency1 pay mix measures cannot distinguish cluster2 from cluster 3 in terms of these 
performance measures. 
 Clusters based on Agency2 pay mix measures show a little different picture on 
organization performance. The companies in cluster 3, characterized by weak emphasis on 
base pay and benefits and strong emphasis on LTI display better performance than companies 
in cluster1 that are characterized by strong emphasis on base pay and benefits, in terms of  
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three performance measures: ROA (p< 0.001), TSR (p< 0.001), and revenue growth (p< 0.001). 
Moreover, cluster solutions based on Agency2 pay mix variables perform better in differentiating 
cluster 2 and cluster 3 because their differences are significant in ROA (p = 0.010) and revenue 
growth (p = 0.002) although the difference in ROE (p = 0.530) and TSR (p = 0.238) are not 
significant. 
 Table 6 shows all the cluster analyses can differentiate ROA, TSR, and revenue growth 
adequately across clusters, but the ability of differentiating ROE varies across theoretical 
perspectives. Cluster analyses using pay mix measures derived from Efficiency wage theory, 
Equity theory2, and Prospect theory2 can significantly differentiate company ROE, but the 
analyses using pay mix measures derived from the other theoretic models do not. 
Organizational Pay Mix:  CAHRS WP 02-02 
 
 
Page 31 
 
TABLE 6
Difference in Performance Measures acorss Clusters
Agency theory 1 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA) Equity theory 2 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA)
ROA 2.82 9.28 12.68 15.22*** ROA 4.16 -0.30 7.90 20.98***
ROE 4.16 18.10 20.38 1.15 ROE 7.13 -5.66 18.13 3.11*
TSR 1.20 1.49 1.80 11.18*** TSR 1.27 1.12 1.37 5.62**
Revenue Growth 0.15 0.38 0.64 24.16*** Revenue Growth 0.12 0.16 0.35 20.78***
Agency theory 2 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA) Prospect theory 1 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA)
ROA 2.31 7.23 12.02 21.79*** ROA 3.21 16.77 12.43 15.79***
ROE 2.72 16.86 19.02 1.78 ROE 5.31 30.78 19.30 0.76
TSR 1.17 1.43 1.60 14.51*** TSR 1.23 1.44 1.62 6.00**
Revenue Growth 0.13 0.29 0.54 34.72*** Revenue Growth 0.16 0.40 0.59 24.64***
Expectancy theory Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA) Prospect theory 2 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA)
ROA 1.61 6.23 6.43 13.48*** ROA 2.91 9.61 11.28 16.69***
ROE 1.81 12.01 10.67 0.99 ROE 6.79 -43.93 18.72 3.87*
TSR 1.18 1.36 1.38 9.63*** TSR 1.22 1.31 1.56 6.99**
Revenue Growth 1.14 0.18 0.35 20.67*** Revenue Growth 0.15 0.27 0.49 23.32***
Efficiency wage theory Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA) Person-organization fit mod Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA)
ROA 3.09 8.73 11.94 14.97*** ROA 2.43 7.58 13.19 17.12***
ROE 7.09 -127.98 19.17 10.85*** ROE 5.57 7.50 19.94 0.25
TSR 1.22 1.34 1.56 6.6** TSR 1.17 1.44 1.75 14.48***
Revenue Growth 0.16 0.31 0.48 20.14*** Revenue Growth 0.13 0.31 0.68 30.37***
Equity theory 1 Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 F (ANOVA)
ROA 1.14 7.93 4.61 20.35***
ROE 2.85 19.05 -1.04 2.77+ 1. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, and *** p<0.001.
TSR 1.11 1.47 1.27 16.12***
Revenue Growth 0.10 0.22 0.31 17.35***
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DISCUSSION 
Pay mix composes a critical dimension of organization compensation policy (Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990) as well as pay level and pay structures. Past research has noticed its 
importance and begun to investigate organization pay mix policy, but its theoretical relevance 
and measurement remains underdeveloped. We offered extensive discussion on pay mix based 
on relevant theories for the first time in the history of pay mix research. Our study also raises a 
question about the measurement of pay mix in the past research. The cluster analyses using 
the nine sets of pay mix measures derived from six theoretic models resulted in somewhat 
dissimilar classification of organization pay mix policy. Even two sets of pay mix measures, both 
of which were derived from the same theoretical perspective, could indicate relatively low 
agreement in their cluster solutions. The results suggest different conceptualization of 
organization pay mix is possible, which may provide different interpretations for the past pay mix 
research. 
Directions for Future Research 
 We hope this study explores a new direction for organization pay mix research. Cluster 
analyses using different sets of pay mix measures offer distinct categorizations of organization 
pay mix policy. Next step may be finding the determinants of organization pay mix policies. For 
instance, the cluster analysis using Agency1 pay mix measures show three distinct clusters. 
What influences the management decisions in choosing one from these pay mix policy? Is any 
cluster of pay mix policy associated with certain organization business policies?  
Similarly, researchers may want to study the consequences of organization pay mix. Six 
theoretic models we discuss are more or less concerned with how pay mix is associated with 
organization performance. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss which set of 
pay mix measures is most accurately describe subsequent organization performance, future 
researcher may want to examine this issue. Our preliminary analysis shows companies 
emphasizing LTI indicate the best performance based on Agency1 and Agency2 pay mix 
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measures; however, it doesn’t show any causal relationship, and it may be because company 
with better performance are likely to choose this pattern of pay mix.  
While we used accounting and financial measures to investigate performance difference 
across clusters, other outcome measures (e.g., productivity, market share, turnover ratio) may 
be more meaningful for certain pay mix measures. For example, efficiency wage theory 
suggests above market pay level leads to an increase in compensation cost, even though it is 
associated with improved productivity. Therefore, accounting and financial performance 
measures may not be appropriate to capture the performance discussed in efficiency wage 
theory. Instead, this theory discusses above market pay leads to low turnover rate, and 
therefore turnover rate may be more appropriate outcome measures for efficiency wage based 
pay mix measures.   
 In sum, we believe that more must be learned about organization pay mix policy both 
from theoretically and methodologically. Agency theory is not the only available theory, and the 
other theoretic models are potentially useful in explaining organization pay mix policy. Simply 
looking at the relative importance of incentives does not fully capture the organization pay mix. 
Since employee compensation comes with different forms, researchers must take into account 
of its multidimensional aspects. This study explores the potential alternative theoretic models 
and corresponding measures, which contributes to further development of organization pay mix 
study. 
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